Thursday, October 31, 2019
Tuesday, October 29, 2019
DRAFT - Impeachment Resolution
116TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. RES.
_______
Directing certain committees to
continue their ongoing investigations as part of the existing House of
Representatives inquiry into whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of
Representatives to exercise its Constitutional power to impeach Donald John
Trump, President of the United States of America, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. MCGOVERN submitted the following
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on _______
RESOLUTION
Directing certain committees to
continue their ongoing investigations as part of the existing House of
Representatives inquiry into whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of
Representatives to exercise its Constitutional power to impeach Donald John
Trump, President of the United States of America, and for other purposes.
Resolved, That the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committees on Financial Services, Foreign Affairs, the Judiciary, Oversight and
Reform, and Ways and Means, are directed to continue their ongoing
investigations as part of the existing House of Representatives inquiry into
whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of Representatives to exercise
its Constitutional power to impeach Donald John Trump, President of the 5
United States of America.
SEC. 2. OPEN AND TRANSPARENT
INVESTIGATIVE PROCEEDINGS BY THE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.
For the purpose of continuing the
investigation described in the first section of this resolution, the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (referred to in this resolution as the
''Permanent Select Committee'') is authorized to conduct proceedings pursuant
to this resolution as follows:
(1) The chair of the Permanent
Select Committee shall designate an open hearing or hearings pursuant to this
section.
(2) Notwithstanding clause 2(j)(2)
of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, upon recognition by
the chair for such purpose under this paragraph during any hearing designated
pursuant to paragraph (1), the chair and ranking minority member of the
Permanent Select Committee shall be permitted to question witnesses for equal
specified periods of longer than five minutes, as determined by the chair. The
time available for each period of questioning under this paragraph shall be
equal for the chair and the ranking minority member. The chair may confer
recognition for multiple periods of such questioning, but each period of
questioning shall not exceed 90 minutes in the aggregate. Only the chair and
ranking minority member, or a Permanent Select Committee employee if yielded to
by the chair or ranking minority member, may question witnesses during such
periods of questioning. At the conclusion of questioning pursuant to this
paragraph, the committee shall proceed with questioning under the five-minute
rule pursuant to clause 2(j)(2)(A) of rule XI.
(3) To allow for full evaluation of
minority witness requests, the ranking minority member may submit to the chair,
in writing, any requests for witness testimony relevant to the investigation
described in the first section of this resolution within 72 hours after notice
is given for the first hearing designated pursuant to paragraph (1). Any such
request shall be accompanied by a detailed written justification of the
relevance of the testimony of each requested witness to the investigation
described in the first section of this resolution.
(4)(A) The ranking minority member
of the Permanent Select Committee is authorized, with the concurrence of the
chair, to require, as deemed necessary to the investigation—
(i) by subpoena or otherwise—
(I) the attendance and testimony 7
of any person (including at a taking of a deposition); and
(II) the production of books,
records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents; and
(ii) by interrogatory, the
furnishing of information.
(B) In the case that the chair
declines to concur in a proposed action of the ranking minority member pursuant
to subparagraph (A), the ranking minority member shall have the right to refer
to the committee for decision the question whether such authority shall be so
exercised and the chair shall convene the committee promptly to render that
decision, subject to the notice procedures for a committee meeting under clause
2(g)(3)(A) and (B) of 23 rule XI.
(C) Subpoenas and interrogatories so
authorized may be signed by the ranking minority member, and may be served by
any person designated by the ranking minority member.
(5) The chair is authorized to make
publicly available in electronic form the transcripts of depositions conducted
by the Permanent Select Committee in furtherance of the investigation described
in the first section of this resolution, with appropriate redactions for
classified and other sensitive information.
(6) The Permanent Select Committee
is directed to issue a report setting forth its findings and any
recommendations and appending any information and materials the Permanent
Select Committee may deem appropriate with respect to the investigation
described in the first section of this resolution. The chair shall transmit
such report and appendices, along with any supplemental, minority, additional,
or dissenting views filed pursuant to clause 2(l) of rule XI, to the Committee
on the Judiciary and make such report publicly available in electronic form,
with appropriate redactions to protect classified and other sensitive
information. The report required by this paragraph shall be prepared in
consultation with the chairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Oversight and Reform.
SEC. 3. TRANSMISSION OF ADDITIONAL
MATERIALS.
The chair of the Permanent Select
Committee or the chair of any other committee having custody of records or
other materials relating to the inquiry referenced in the first section of this
resolution is authorized, in consulta6 tion with the ranking minority member,
to transfer such records or materials to the Committee on the Judiciary.
SEC. 4. IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY
PROCEDURES IN THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY.
(a) The House authorizes the
Committee on the Judiciary to conduct proceedings relating to the impeachment
inquiry referenced in the first section of this resolution pursuant to the
procedures
submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the chair of
the Committee on Rules, including such procedures as to allow for the
participation of the President and his counsel.
(b) The Committee on the Judiciary
is authorized to promulgate additional procedures as it deems necessary for the
fair and efficient conduct of committee hearings held pursuant to this
resolution, provided that the additional procedures are not inconsistent with
the procedures referenced in subsection (a), the Rules of the Committee, and
the Rules of the House.
(c)(1) The ranking minority member
of the Committee on the Judiciary is authorized, with the concurrence of the
chair of the Committee on the Judiciary, to require, as deemed necessary to the
investigation—
(A) by subpoena or otherwise—
(i) the attendance and testimony of
any person (including at a taking of a deposition);
(ii) the production of books,
records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents; and
(B) by interrogatory, the furnishing
of information.
(2) In the case that the chair
declines to concur in a proposed action of the ranking minority member pursuant
to paragraph (1), the ranking minority member shall have the right to refer to
the committee for decision the question whether such authority shall be so
exercised and the chair shall convene the committee promptly to render that
decision, subject to the notice procedures for a committee meeting under clause
2(g)(3)(A) and (B) of rule XI.
(3) Subpoenas and interrogatories so
authorized may be signed by the ranking minority member, and may be served by
any person designated by the ranking minority member.
(d) The Committee on the Judiciary
shall report to the House of Representatives such resolutions, articles of
impeachment, or other recommendations as it deems proper.
Statement of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman
Opening Statement of Lieutenant
Colonel Alexander S. Vindman
Before the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
House Committee on Oversight and Reform
October 29, 2019
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member,
thank you for the opportunity to address the Committees concerning the
activities relating to Ukraine and my role in the events under investigation.
Background
I have dedicated my entire
professional life to the United States of America. For more than two decades,
it has been my honor to serve as an officer in the United States Army. As an
infantry officer, I served multiple overseas tours, including South Korea and
Germany, and a deployment to Iraq for combat operations. In Iraq, I was wounded
in an IED attack and awarded a Purple Heart. Since 2008, I have been a Foreign
Area Officer specializing in Eurasia.
In this role, I have served in the United
States’ embassies in Kiev, Ukraine and Moscow, Russia. In Washington, D.C., I
was a politico-military affairs officer for Russia for the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs where I authored the principal strategy for managing competition
with Russia.
In July 2018, I was asked to serve
at the National Security Council. The privilege of serving my country is not
only rooted in my military service, but also in my personal history.
I sit here, as a Lieutenant Colonel
in the United States Army, an immigrant. My family fled the Soviet Union when I
was three and a half years old. Upon arriving in New York City in 1979, my
father worked multiple jobs to support us, all the while learning English at
night. He stressed to us the importance of fully integrating into our adopted
country. For many years, life was quite difficult.
In spite of our challenging
beginnings, my family worked to build its own American dream. I have a deep
appreciation for American values and ideals and the power of freedom. I am a
patriot, and it is my sacred duty and honor to advance and defend OUR country,
irrespective of party or politics.
For over twenty years as an active
duty United States military officer and diplomat, I have served this country in
a nonpartisan manner, and have done so with the utmost respect and
professionalism for both Republican and Democratic administrations.
Introduction
Before recounting my recollection of
various events under investigation, I want to clarify a few issues. I am
appearing today voluntarily pursuant to a subpoena and will answer all
questions to the best of my recollection. I want the Committees to know I am
not the whistleblower who brought this issue to the CIA and the Committees’
attention. I do not know who the whistleblower is and I would not feel
comfortable to speculate as to the identity of the whistleblower.
Also, as I will detail herein, I did
convey certain concerns internally to National Security officials in accordance
with my decades of experience and training, sense of duty, and obligation to
operate within the chain of command. As an active duty military officer, the
command structure is extremely important to me. On many occasions I have been
told I should express my views and share my concerns with my chain of command
and proper authorities. I believe that any good military officer should and
would do the same, thus providing his or her best advice to leadership.
Furthermore, in performing my
coordination role as a Director on the National Security Council, I provided
readouts of relevant meetings and communications to a very small group of
properly cleared national security counterparts with a relevant need-to-know.
My Service on the National Security
Council
When I joined the White House’s
National Security Council(“NSC”), I reported to Dr. Fiona Hill, who in turn
reported to John Bolton, the National Security Advisor. My role at the NSC
includes developing, coordinating, and executing plans and policies to manage
the full range of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic national
security issues for the countries in my portfolio, which includes Ukraine.
In my position, I coordinate with a
superb cohort of inter-agency partners. I regularly prepare internal memoranda,
talking points, and other materials for the National Security Advisor and
senior staff. Most of my interactions relate to national security issues and are
therefore especially sensitive. I would urge the Committees to carefully
balance the need for information against the impact that disclosure would have
on our foreign policy and national security.
I have never had direct contact or
communications with the President.
The Geopolitical Importance of
Ukraine
Since 2008, Russia has manifested an
overtly aggressive foreign policy, leveraging military power and employing
hybrid warfare to achieve its objectives of regional hegemony and global
influence. Absent a deterrent to dissuade Russia from such aggression, there is
an increased risk of further confrontations with the West. In this situation, a
strong and independent Ukraine is critical to U.S. national security interests because
Ukraine is a frontline state and a bulwark against Russian aggression. In spite
of being under assault from Russia for more than five years, Ukraine has taken
major steps towards integrating with the West.
The U.S. government policy
community’s view is that the election of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the
promise of reforms to eliminate corruption will lock in Ukraine’s
Western-leaning trajectory, and allow Ukraine to realize its dream of a vibrant
democracy and economic prosperity. Given this perspective and my commitment to
advancing our government’s strategic interests, I will now recount several
events that occurred.
Relevant Events
When I joined the NSC in July 2018,
I began implementing the administration’s policy on Ukraine. In the Spring of
2019, I became aware of outside influencers promoting a false narrative of
Ukraine inconsistent with the consensus views of the interagency. This
narrative was harmful to U.S. government policy.
While my interagency colleagues and
I were becoming increasingly optimistic on Ukraine’s prospects, this alternative
narrative undermined U.S. government efforts to expand cooperation with
Ukraine.
April 21, 2019: President Trump
Calls Ukraine President Zelenskyy
On April 21, 2019, Volodymyr
Zelenskyy was elected President of Ukraine in a landslide victory. President
Zelenskyy was seen as a unifying figure within the country. He was the first
candidate to win a majority in every region of the country, breaking the claims
that Ukraine would be subject to a perpetual divide between the Ukrainian-and
Russian-speaking populations. President Zelenskyy ran on a platform of unity,
reform, and anti-corruption, which resonated with the entire country.
In support of U.S. policy objectives
to support Ukrainian sovereignty, President Trump called President Zelenskyyon
April 21, 2019. I was one of several staff and officers who listened to the
call. The call was positive, and President Trump expressed his desire to work
with President Zelenskyy and extended an invitation to visit the White House.
May 21, 2019: Inauguration
Delegation Goes to Ukraine
OnMay 21, 2019,I was directed by
Ambassador Bolton and Dr. Hill to join the delegation attending President
Zelenkskyy’s inauguration. When the delegation returned, they provided a
debriefing to President Trump and explained their positive assessment of President
Zelenskyy and his team. I did not participate in the debriefing.
Oleksandr Danylyuk Visit –July 10,
2019
On July 10, 2019, Oleksandr
Danylyuk, the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council for
Ukraine, visited Washington, D.C. for a meeting with National Security Advisor
Bolton. Ambassadors Volker and Sondland also attended, along with Energy
Secretary Rick Perry. The meeting proceeded well until the Ukrainians broached
the subject of a meeting between the two presidents. The Ukrainians saw this
meeting as critically important in order to solidify the support of their most
important international partner.
Amb. Sondland started to speak about
Ukraine delivering specific investigations in order to secure the meeting with
the President, at which time Ambassador Bolton cut the meeting short. Following
this meeting, there was a scheduled debriefing during which Amb. Sondland emphasized
the importance that Ukraine deliver the investigations into the 2016 election,
the Bidens, and Burisma. I stated to Amb. Sondland that his statements were
inappropriate, that the request to investigate Biden and his son had nothing to
do with national security, and that such investigations were not something the
NSC was going to get involved in or push.
Dr. Hill then entered the room and
asserted to Amb. Sondland that his statements were inappropriate. Following the
debriefing meeting, I reported my concerns to the NSC’s lead counsel. Dr. Hill
also reported the incident to the NSC’s lead counsel.
Election Call –July 25, 2019
On July 21, 2019, President
Zelenskyy’s party won Parliamentary elections in a landslide victory. The NSC
proposed that President Trump call President Zelenskyy to congratulate him. On
July 25, 2019, the call occurred. I listened in on the call in the Situation
Room with colleagues from the NSC and the office of the Vice President. As the
transcript is in the public record, we are all aware of what was said. I was concerned
by the call. I did not think it was proper to demand that a foreign government
investigate a U.S. citizen, and I was worried about the implications for the
U.S. government’s support of Ukraine.
I realized that if Ukraine pursued
an investigation into the Bidens and Burisma, it would likely be interpreted as
a partisan play which would undoubtedly result in Ukraine losing the bipartisan
support it has thus far maintained. This would all undermine U.S. national
security. Following the call, I again reported my concerns to NSC’s lead
counsel.
Conclusion
The United States and Ukraine are
and must remain strategic partners, working together to realize the shared
vision of a stable, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine that is integrated into
the Euro-Atlantic community. Our partnership is rooted in the idea that free
citizens should be able to exercise their democratic rights, choose their own
destiny, and live in peace.
It has been a great honor to serve
the American people and a privilege to work in the White House and on the
National Security Council. I hope to continue to serve and advance America’s
national security interests. Thank you again for your consideration, and now I
would be happy to answer your questions.
Thursday, October 17, 2019
Hard Irish Border Will Cause Deaths - IRA Statement
|
© 2019 Irish Republican News
Saturday, October 12, 2019
Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch - Opening Statement
Opening Statement of Marie L. Yovanovitch to the House of
Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on
Foreign Affairs,and Committee on Oversight and Reform
October 11,2019
'Thank you for the opportunity to start with this statement
today. For the last 33 years,it has been my great honor to serve the American people
as a Foreign Service Officer, over six Administrations—four Republican,and two
Democratic. I have served in seven different countries,five of them hardship
posts, and was appointed to serve as an ambassador three times—twice by a
Republican President,and once by a Democrat.Throughout my career, I have stayed
true to the oath that Foreign Service Officers take and observe every day:
“that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against
all enemies, foreign and domestic;” and “that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same.” Like all foreign service officers with whom I
have been privileged to serve,I have understood that oath as a commitment to serve on
a strictly nonpartisan basis, to advance the foreign policy determined by the
incumbent President, and to work at all times to strengthen our national
security and promote our national interests.
My Background
I come by these beliefs honestly and through personal
experience. My parents fled Communist and Nazi regimes. Having seen, first
hand, the war, poverty and displacement common to totalitarian regimes, they
valued the freedom and democracy the U.S. represents. And they raised me to
cherish these values as well. Their sacrifices allowed me to attend Princeton
University, where I focused my studies on the Soviet Union. Given my
upbringing, it
has been the honor of a lifetime to help to foster those
principles as a career Foreign Service Officer. From August 2016 until May
2019, I served as the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. Our policy, fully embraced by
Democrats and Republicans alike, was to help Ukraine become a stable and
independent democratic state, with a market economy integrated into Europe.'
Continue reading here: https://www.lawfareblog.com/former-ambassador-marie-yovanovitchs-opening-statement-congress?fbclid=IwAR3-CtncwRqPOAUfhBwriqTc3zzCmO-MhcyHgF5HmHDshEcLGhtZFeAQbzA
Thursday, October 10, 2019
Giuliani Associates Indicted
Two foreign-born associates of President Donald Trump's personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, have been charged with campaign finance violations, according to an indictment unsealed Thursday.
Igor
Fruman and Lev Parnas worked with Giuliani, the attorney has said
previously, as part of his dealings in Ukraine that involved efforts to
encourage the nation to investigate former Vice President Joe Biden and
his son, Hunter Biden.
See the 21 page indictment here:
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-impeachment-inquiry/read-charges-against-giuliani-associates-igor-fruman-lev-parnas-n1064641
Tuesday, October 8, 2019
Bi-Partisan Senate Report on Russian Election Intereference
UNITED STATES SENATE BI PARTISAN REPORT ON RUSSIAN ELECTION INTERFERENCE
The Senate Intelligence
Committee released Tuesday the second volume of its report on Russian
interference in the 2016 presidential election, which focuses on the
social media disinformation campaign led by the Kremlin-backed Internet
Research Agency.
Why it matters: The
report, which provides further bipartisan evidence of Russia's election
meddling in 2016, finds "the IRA sought to influence the 2016 U.S.
presidential election by harming Hillary Clinton’s chances of success
and supporting Donald Trump at the direction of the Kremlin."
- It also says that the IRA's activities were "part of a broader, sophisticated, and ongoing information warfare campaign designed to sow discord in American politics and society" and that IRA activity increased, rather than decreased, after Election Day 2016.
The big picture: As
one of its recommendations, the committee calls on the Trump
administration to "reinforce with the public the danger of attempted
foreign interference in the 2020 election."
Read the report here - https://www.axios.com/senate-intelligence-committee-russian-interference-report-425274e8-1780-44c3-963a-cd839ef1cbe5.html
Thursday, September 26, 2019
Text - Declassified whistleblower complaint on President Donald Trump and Ukraine
Read: Whistleblower complaint regarding President Trump and Ukraine
Updated 11:27 AM ET, Thu September 26, 2019
The declassified whistleblower complaint on President Donald Trump and Ukraine has been released.
Read it below:
Dear Chairman Burr and Chairman Schiff:
I am reporting an "urgent concern" in accordance with the procedures outlined in 50 U.S.C. §3033(k)(5)(A). This letter is UNCLASSIFIED when separated from the attachment.
In the course of my official duties, I have received information from multiple U.S. Government officials that the President of the United States is using the power of his office to solicit interference from a foreign country in the 2020 U.S. election. This interference includes, among other things, pressuring a foreign country to investigate one of the President's main domestic political rivals. The President' s personal lawyer, Mr. Rudolph Giuliani, is a central figure in this effort. Attorney General Barr appears to be involved as well.
Over the past four months, more than half a dozen U.S. officials have informed me of various facts related to this effort. The information provided herein was relayed to me in the course of official interagency business. It is routine for U.S. officials with responsibility for a particular regional or functional portfolio to share such information with one another in order to inform policymaking and analysis.
I was not a direct witness to most of the events described. However, I found my colleagues' accounts of these events to be credible because, in almost all cases, multiple officials recounted fact patterns that were consistent with one another. In addition, a variety of information consistent with these private accounts has been reported publicly.
I am deeply concerned that the actions described below constitute "a serious or flagrant problem, abuse, or violation of law or Executive Order" that "does not include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters," consistent with the definition of an"urgent concern" in 50 U.S.C. §3033(k)(5)(G). I am therefore fulfilling my duty to report this information, through proper legal channels, to the relevant authorities.
I am also concerned that these actions pose risks to U.S. national security and undermine the U.S. Government's efforts to deter and counter foreign interference in U.S. elections.
To the best of my knowledge, the entirety of this statement is unclassified when separated from the classified enclosure. I have endeavored to apply the classification standards outlined in Executive Order (EO) 13526 and to separate out information that I know or have reason to believe is classified for national security purposes.
If a classification marking is applied retroactively, I believe it is incumbent upon the classifying authority to explain why such a marking was applied, and to which specific information it pertains.
I. The 25 July Presidential phone call
Early in the morning of 25 July, the President spoke by telephone with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. I do not know which side initiated the call. This was the first publicly acknowledged call between the two leaders since a brief congratulatory call after Mr. Zelenskyy won the presidency on 21 April.
Multiple White House officials with direct knowledge of the call informed me that, after an initial exchange of pleasantries, the President used the remainder of the call to advance his personal interests. Namely, he sought to pressure the Ukrainian leader to take actions to help the President's 2020 reelection bid. According to the White House officials who had direct knowledge of the call, the President pressured Mr. Zelenskyy to, inter alia:
initiate or continue an investigation into the activities of former Vice President Joseph Biden and his son, Hunter Biden;
assist in purportedly uncovering that allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election originated in Ukraine , with a specific request that the Ukrainian leader locate and turn over servers used by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and examined by the U.S. cyber security firm Crowdstrike, which initially reported that Russian hackers had penetrated the DNC's networks in 2016; and
meet or speak with two people the President named explicitly as his personal envoys on these matters, Mr. Giuliani and Attorney General Barr, to whom the President referred multiple times in tandem.
The President also praised Ukraine's Prosecutor General, Mr. Yuriy Lutsenko, and suggested that Mr. Zelenskyy might want to keep him in his position. (Note: Starting in March 2019, Mr. Lutsenko made a series of public allegations-many of which he later walked back -- about the Biden family's activities in Ukraine, Ukrainian officials' purported involvement in the 2016 U.S. election, and the activities of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv. See Part IV for additional context.)
The White House officials who told me this information were deeply disturbed by what had transpired in the phone call. They told me that there was already a "discussion ongoing" with White House lawyers about how to treat the call because of the likelihood, in the officials' retelling, that they had witnessed the President abuse his office for personal gain.
The Ukrainian side was the first to publicly acknowledge the phone call. On the evening of 25 July, a readout was posted on the website of the Ukrainian President that contained the following line (translation from original Russian-language readout):
"Donald Trump expressed his conviction that the new Ukrainian government will be able to quickly improve Ukraine's image and complete the investigation of corruption cases that have held back cooperation between Ukraine and the United States."
Aside from the above-mentioned "cases" purportedly dealing with the Biden family and the 2016 U.S. election, I was told by White House officials that no other "cases" were discussed.
Based on my understanding, there were approximately a dozen White House officials who listened to the call -- a mixture of policy officials and duty officers in the White House Situation Room, as is customary. The officials I spoke with told me that participation in the call had not been restricted in advance because everyone expected it would be a "routine" call with a foreign leader. I do not know whether anyone was physically present with the President during the call.
In addition to White House personnel, I was told that a State Department official, Mr. T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, also listened in on the call.
I was not the only non-White House official to receive a readout of the call. Based on my understanding, multiple State Department and Intelligence Community officials were also briefed on the contents of the call as outlined above.
II. Efforts to restrict access to records related to the call
In the days following the phone call, I learned from multiple U.S. officials that senior White House officials had intervened to "lock down" all records of the phone call, especially the official word-for-word transcript of the call that was produced -- as is customary -- by the White House Situation Room. This set of actions underscored to me that White House officials understood the gravity of what had transpired in the call.
White House officials told me that they were "directed" by White House lawyers to remove the electronic transcript from the computer system in which such transcripts are typically stored for coordination, finalization, and distribution to Cabinet-level officials.
Instead, the transcript was loaded into a separate electronic system that is otherwise used to store and handle classified information of an especially sensitive nature. One White House official described this act as an abuse of this electronic system because the call did not contain anything remotely sensitive from a national security perspective.
I do not know whether similar measures were taken to restrict access to other records of the call, such as contemporaneous handwritten notes taken by those who listened in.
III. Ongoing concerns
On 26 July, a day after the call, U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Kurt Volker visited Kyiv and met with President Zelenskyy and a variety of Ukrainian political figures. Ambassador Volker was accompanied in his meetings by U.S. Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland. Based on multiple readouts of these meetings recounted to me by various U.S. officials, Ambassadors Volker and Sandland reportedly provided advice to the Ukrainian leadership about how to "navigate" the demands that the President had made of Mr. Zelenskyy.
I also learned from multiple U.S. officials that, on or about 2 August, Mr. Giuliani reportedly traveled to Madrid to meet with one of President Zelenskyy' s advisers, Andriy Yermak. The U.S. officials characterized this meeting, which was not reported publicly at the time, as a "direct follow-up" to the President's call with Mr. Zelenskyy about the "cases" they had discussed.
Separately, multiple U.S. officials told me that Mr. Giuliani had reportedly privately reached out to a variety of other Zelenskyy advisers, including Chief of Staff Andriy Bohdan and Acting Chairman of the Security Service of Ukraine Ivan Bakanov.
I do not know whether those officials met or spoke with Mr. Giuliani, but I was told separately by multiple U.S. officials that Mr. Yermak and Mr. Bakanov intended to travel to Washington in mid-August.
On 9 August, the President told reporters: "I think [President Zelenskyy] is going to make a deal with President Putin, and he will be invited to the White House. And we look forward to seeing him. He's already been invited to the White House, and he wants to come. And I think he will. He's a very reasonable guy. He wants to see peace in Ukraine, and I think he will be coming very soon, actually."
IV. Circumstances leading up to the 25 July Presidential phone call
Beginning in late March 2019, a series of articles appeared in an online publication called The Hill. In these articles, several Ukrainian officials -- most notably, Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko -- made a series of allegations against other Ukrainian officials and current and former
U.S. officials. Mr. Lutsenko and his colleagues alleged, inter alia:
that they possessed evidence that Ukrainian officials -- namely, Head of the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine Artem Sytnyk and Member of Parliament Serhiy Leshchenko -- had "interfered" in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, allegedly in collaboration with the DNC and the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv;
that the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv -- specifically, U.S. Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, who had criticized Mr. Lutsenko' s organization for its poor record on fighting corruption -- had allegedly obstructed Ukrainian law enforcement agencies' pursuit of corruption cases, including by providing a "do not prosecute" list, and had blocked Ukrainian prosecutors from traveling to the United States expressly to prevent them from delivering their "evidence" about the 2016 U.S. election; and
that former Vice President Biden had pressured former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in 2016 to fire then Ukrainian Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin in order to quash a purported criminal probe into Burisma Holdings, a Ukrainian energy company on whose board the former Vice President's son, Hunter, sat.
In several public comments, Mr. Lutsenko also stated that he wished to communicate directly with Attorney General Barr on these matters.
The allegations by Mr. Lutsenko came on the eve of the first round of Ukraine's presidential election on 31 March. By that time, Mr. Lutsenko's political patron, President Poroshenko, was trailing Mr. Zelenskyy in the polls and appeared likely to be defeated. Mr. Zelenskyy had made known his desire to replace Mr. Lutsenko as Prosecutor General. On 21 April, Mr. Poroshenko lost the runoff to Mr. Zelenskyy by a landslide. See Enclosure for additional information.
It was also publicly reported that Mr. Giuliani had met on at least two occasions with Mr. Lutsenko: once in New York in late January and again in Warsaw in mid-February. In addition, it was publicly reported that Mr. Giuliani had spoken in late 2018 to former Prosecutor General Shokin, in a Skype call arranged by two associates of Mr. Giuliani. to
On 25 April in an interview with Fox News, the President called Mr. Lutsenko's claims "big" and "incredible" and stated that the Attorney General "would want to see this."
On or about 29 April, I learned from U.S. officials with direct knowledge of the situation that Ambassador Yovanovitch had been suddenly recalled to Washington by senior State Department officials for "consultations" and would most likely be removed from her position.
Around the same time, I also learned from a U.S. official that "associates" of Mr. Giuliani were trying to make contact with the incoming Zelenskyy team.
On 6 May, the State Department announced that Ambassador Yovanovitch would be ending her assignment in Kyiv "as planned."
However, several U.S. officials told me that, in fact, her tour was curtailed because of pressure stemming from Mr. Lutsenko's allegations. Mr. Giuliani subsequently stated in an interview with a Ukrainian journalist published on 14 May that Ambassador Yovanovitch was "removed ... because she was part of the efforts against the President."
On 9 May, The New York Times reported that Mr. Giuliani planned to travel to Ukraine to press the Ukrainian government to pursue investigations that would help the President in his 2020 reelection bid.
In his multitude of public statements leading up to and in the wake of the publication of this article, Mr. Giuliani confirmed that he was focused on encouraging Ukrainian authorities to pursue investigations into alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and alleged wrongdoing by the Biden family. 12
On the afternoon of 10 May, the President stated in an interview with Politico that he planned to speak with Mr. Giuliani about the trip.
A few hours later, Mr. Giuliani publicly canceled his trip, claiming that Mr. Zelenskyy was "surrounded by enemies of the [U.S.] President... and of the United States."
On 11 May, Mr. Lutsenko met for two hours with President-elect Zelenskyy, according to a public account given several days later by Mr. Lutsenko. Mr. Lutsenko publicly stated that he had told Mr. Zelenskyy that he wished to remain as Prosecutor General.
Starting in mid-May, I heard from multiple U.S. officials that they were deeply concerned by what they viewed as Mr. Giuliani's circumvention of national security decisionmaking processes to engage with Ukrainian officials and relay messages back and forth between Kyiv and the President. These officials also told me:
that State Department officials, including Ambassadors Volker and Sondland, had spoken with Mr. Giulianiin an attempt to "contain the damage" to U.S. national security; and
that Ambassadors Volker and Sandland during this time period met with members of the new Ukrainian administration and, in addition to discussing policy matters, sought to help Ukrainian leaders understand and respond to the differing messages they were receiving from official U.S. channels on the-one-hand, and from Mr. Giuliani on the other.
During this same timeframe, multiple U.S. officials told me that the Ukrainian leadership was led to believe that a meeting or phone call between the President and President Zelenskyy would depend on whether Zelenskyy showed willingness to " play ball" on the issues that had been publicly aired by Mr. Lutsenko and Mr. Giuliani. (Note: This was the general understanding of the state of affairs as conveyed to me by U.S. officials from late May into early July. I do not know who delivered this message to the Ukrainian leadership, or when.) See Enclosure for additional information.
Shortly after President Zelenskyy' s inauguration, it was publicly reported that Mr. Giuliani met with two other Ukrainian officials: Ukraine's Special Anticorruption Prosecutor, Mr. Nazar Kholodnytskyy, and a former Ukrainian diplomat named Andriy Telizhenko. Both Mr. Kholodnytskyy and Mr. Telizhenko are allies of Mr. Lutsenko and made similar allegations in the above-mentioned series of articles in The Hill.
On 13 June, the President told ABC' s George Stephanopoulos that he would accept damaging information on his political rivals from a foreign government.
On 21 June, Mr. Giuliani tweeted: "New Pres of Ukraine still silent on investigation of Ukrainian interference in 2016 and alleged Biden bribery of Poroshenko. Time for leadership and investigate both if you want to purge how Ukraine was abused by Hillary and Clinton people."
In mid-July, I learned of a sudden change of policy with respect to U.S. assistance for Ukraine. See Enclosure for additional information.
ENCLOSURE: Classified appendix
(U) CLASSIFIED APPENDIX
(U) Supplementary classified information is provided as follows:
(U) Additional information related to Section II
According to multiple White House officials I spoke with, the transcript of the President's call with President Zelenskyy was placed into a computer system managed directly by the National Security Council (NSC) Directorate for Intelligence Programs. This is a standalone computer system reserved for codeword-level intelligence information , such as covert action. According to information I received from White House officials, some officials voiced concerns internally that this would be an abuse of the system and was not consistent with the responsibilities of the Directorate for Intelligence Programs. According to White House officials I spoke with, this was "not the first time" under this Administration that a Presidential transcript was placed into this codeword-level system solely for the purpose of protecting politically sensitive — rather than national security sensitive — information .
(U) Additional information related to Section IV
[Redaction]
I would like to expand upon two issues mentioned in Section IV that might have a connection with the overall effort to pressure the Ukrainian leadership. As I do not know definitively whether the below-mentioned decisions are connected to the broader efforts I describe, I have chosen to include them in the classified annex. If they indeed represent genuine policy deliberations and decisions formulated to advance U.S. foreign policy and national security, one might be able to make a reasonable case that the facts are classified
I learned from U.S. officials that, on or around 14 May, the President instructed Vice President Pence to cancel his planned travel to Ukraine to attend President Zelenskyy' s inauguration on 20 May; Secretary of Energy Rick Perry led the delegation instead. According to these officials, it was also "made clear" to them that the President did not want to meet with Mr. Zelenskyy until he saw how Zelenskyy "chose to act" in office. I do not know how this guidance was communicated, or by whom. I also do not know whether this action was connected with the broader understanding, described in the unclassified letter, that a meeting or phone call between the President and President Zelenskyy would depend on whether Zelenskyy showed willingness to "play ball'' on the issues that had been publicly aired by Mr. Lutsenko and Mr. Giuliani,
On 18 July, an Office of Management and Budget (0MB) official informed Departments and Agencies that the President "earlier that month" had issued instructions to suspend all U.S. security assistance to Ukraine. Neither OMB nor the NSC staff knew why this instruction had been issued. During interagency meetings on 23 July and 26 July, OMB officials again stated explicitly that the instruction to suspend this assistance had come directly from the President, but they still were unaware of a policy rationale. As of early August, I heard from U.S. officials that some Ukrainian officials were aware that U.S. aid might be in jeopardy, but I do not know how or when they learned of it.
Updated 11:27 AM ET, Thu September 26, 2019
The declassified whistleblower complaint on President Donald Trump and Ukraine has been released.
Read it below:
Dear Chairman Burr and Chairman Schiff:
I am reporting an "urgent concern" in accordance with the procedures outlined in 50 U.S.C. §3033(k)(5)(A). This letter is UNCLASSIFIED when separated from the attachment.
In the course of my official duties, I have received information from multiple U.S. Government officials that the President of the United States is using the power of his office to solicit interference from a foreign country in the 2020 U.S. election. This interference includes, among other things, pressuring a foreign country to investigate one of the President's main domestic political rivals. The President' s personal lawyer, Mr. Rudolph Giuliani, is a central figure in this effort. Attorney General Barr appears to be involved as well.
Over the past four months, more than half a dozen U.S. officials have informed me of various facts related to this effort. The information provided herein was relayed to me in the course of official interagency business. It is routine for U.S. officials with responsibility for a particular regional or functional portfolio to share such information with one another in order to inform policymaking and analysis.
I was not a direct witness to most of the events described. However, I found my colleagues' accounts of these events to be credible because, in almost all cases, multiple officials recounted fact patterns that were consistent with one another. In addition, a variety of information consistent with these private accounts has been reported publicly.
I am deeply concerned that the actions described below constitute "a serious or flagrant problem, abuse, or violation of law or Executive Order" that "does not include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters," consistent with the definition of an"urgent concern" in 50 U.S.C. §3033(k)(5)(G). I am therefore fulfilling my duty to report this information, through proper legal channels, to the relevant authorities.
I am also concerned that these actions pose risks to U.S. national security and undermine the U.S. Government's efforts to deter and counter foreign interference in U.S. elections.
To the best of my knowledge, the entirety of this statement is unclassified when separated from the classified enclosure. I have endeavored to apply the classification standards outlined in Executive Order (EO) 13526 and to separate out information that I know or have reason to believe is classified for national security purposes.
If a classification marking is applied retroactively, I believe it is incumbent upon the classifying authority to explain why such a marking was applied, and to which specific information it pertains.
I. The 25 July Presidential phone call
Early in the morning of 25 July, the President spoke by telephone with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. I do not know which side initiated the call. This was the first publicly acknowledged call between the two leaders since a brief congratulatory call after Mr. Zelenskyy won the presidency on 21 April.
Multiple White House officials with direct knowledge of the call informed me that, after an initial exchange of pleasantries, the President used the remainder of the call to advance his personal interests. Namely, he sought to pressure the Ukrainian leader to take actions to help the President's 2020 reelection bid. According to the White House officials who had direct knowledge of the call, the President pressured Mr. Zelenskyy to, inter alia:
initiate or continue an investigation into the activities of former Vice President Joseph Biden and his son, Hunter Biden;
assist in purportedly uncovering that allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election originated in Ukraine , with a specific request that the Ukrainian leader locate and turn over servers used by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and examined by the U.S. cyber security firm Crowdstrike, which initially reported that Russian hackers had penetrated the DNC's networks in 2016; and
meet or speak with two people the President named explicitly as his personal envoys on these matters, Mr. Giuliani and Attorney General Barr, to whom the President referred multiple times in tandem.
The President also praised Ukraine's Prosecutor General, Mr. Yuriy Lutsenko, and suggested that Mr. Zelenskyy might want to keep him in his position. (Note: Starting in March 2019, Mr. Lutsenko made a series of public allegations-many of which he later walked back -- about the Biden family's activities in Ukraine, Ukrainian officials' purported involvement in the 2016 U.S. election, and the activities of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv. See Part IV for additional context.)
The White House officials who told me this information were deeply disturbed by what had transpired in the phone call. They told me that there was already a "discussion ongoing" with White House lawyers about how to treat the call because of the likelihood, in the officials' retelling, that they had witnessed the President abuse his office for personal gain.
The Ukrainian side was the first to publicly acknowledge the phone call. On the evening of 25 July, a readout was posted on the website of the Ukrainian President that contained the following line (translation from original Russian-language readout):
"Donald Trump expressed his conviction that the new Ukrainian government will be able to quickly improve Ukraine's image and complete the investigation of corruption cases that have held back cooperation between Ukraine and the United States."
Aside from the above-mentioned "cases" purportedly dealing with the Biden family and the 2016 U.S. election, I was told by White House officials that no other "cases" were discussed.
Based on my understanding, there were approximately a dozen White House officials who listened to the call -- a mixture of policy officials and duty officers in the White House Situation Room, as is customary. The officials I spoke with told me that participation in the call had not been restricted in advance because everyone expected it would be a "routine" call with a foreign leader. I do not know whether anyone was physically present with the President during the call.
In addition to White House personnel, I was told that a State Department official, Mr. T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, also listened in on the call.
I was not the only non-White House official to receive a readout of the call. Based on my understanding, multiple State Department and Intelligence Community officials were also briefed on the contents of the call as outlined above.
II. Efforts to restrict access to records related to the call
In the days following the phone call, I learned from multiple U.S. officials that senior White House officials had intervened to "lock down" all records of the phone call, especially the official word-for-word transcript of the call that was produced -- as is customary -- by the White House Situation Room. This set of actions underscored to me that White House officials understood the gravity of what had transpired in the call.
White House officials told me that they were "directed" by White House lawyers to remove the electronic transcript from the computer system in which such transcripts are typically stored for coordination, finalization, and distribution to Cabinet-level officials.
Instead, the transcript was loaded into a separate electronic system that is otherwise used to store and handle classified information of an especially sensitive nature. One White House official described this act as an abuse of this electronic system because the call did not contain anything remotely sensitive from a national security perspective.
I do not know whether similar measures were taken to restrict access to other records of the call, such as contemporaneous handwritten notes taken by those who listened in.
III. Ongoing concerns
On 26 July, a day after the call, U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Kurt Volker visited Kyiv and met with President Zelenskyy and a variety of Ukrainian political figures. Ambassador Volker was accompanied in his meetings by U.S. Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland. Based on multiple readouts of these meetings recounted to me by various U.S. officials, Ambassadors Volker and Sandland reportedly provided advice to the Ukrainian leadership about how to "navigate" the demands that the President had made of Mr. Zelenskyy.
I also learned from multiple U.S. officials that, on or about 2 August, Mr. Giuliani reportedly traveled to Madrid to meet with one of President Zelenskyy' s advisers, Andriy Yermak. The U.S. officials characterized this meeting, which was not reported publicly at the time, as a "direct follow-up" to the President's call with Mr. Zelenskyy about the "cases" they had discussed.
Separately, multiple U.S. officials told me that Mr. Giuliani had reportedly privately reached out to a variety of other Zelenskyy advisers, including Chief of Staff Andriy Bohdan and Acting Chairman of the Security Service of Ukraine Ivan Bakanov.
I do not know whether those officials met or spoke with Mr. Giuliani, but I was told separately by multiple U.S. officials that Mr. Yermak and Mr. Bakanov intended to travel to Washington in mid-August.
On 9 August, the President told reporters: "I think [President Zelenskyy] is going to make a deal with President Putin, and he will be invited to the White House. And we look forward to seeing him. He's already been invited to the White House, and he wants to come. And I think he will. He's a very reasonable guy. He wants to see peace in Ukraine, and I think he will be coming very soon, actually."
IV. Circumstances leading up to the 25 July Presidential phone call
Beginning in late March 2019, a series of articles appeared in an online publication called The Hill. In these articles, several Ukrainian officials -- most notably, Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko -- made a series of allegations against other Ukrainian officials and current and former
U.S. officials. Mr. Lutsenko and his colleagues alleged, inter alia:
that they possessed evidence that Ukrainian officials -- namely, Head of the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine Artem Sytnyk and Member of Parliament Serhiy Leshchenko -- had "interfered" in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, allegedly in collaboration with the DNC and the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv;
that the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv -- specifically, U.S. Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, who had criticized Mr. Lutsenko' s organization for its poor record on fighting corruption -- had allegedly obstructed Ukrainian law enforcement agencies' pursuit of corruption cases, including by providing a "do not prosecute" list, and had blocked Ukrainian prosecutors from traveling to the United States expressly to prevent them from delivering their "evidence" about the 2016 U.S. election; and
that former Vice President Biden had pressured former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in 2016 to fire then Ukrainian Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin in order to quash a purported criminal probe into Burisma Holdings, a Ukrainian energy company on whose board the former Vice President's son, Hunter, sat.
In several public comments, Mr. Lutsenko also stated that he wished to communicate directly with Attorney General Barr on these matters.
The allegations by Mr. Lutsenko came on the eve of the first round of Ukraine's presidential election on 31 March. By that time, Mr. Lutsenko's political patron, President Poroshenko, was trailing Mr. Zelenskyy in the polls and appeared likely to be defeated. Mr. Zelenskyy had made known his desire to replace Mr. Lutsenko as Prosecutor General. On 21 April, Mr. Poroshenko lost the runoff to Mr. Zelenskyy by a landslide. See Enclosure for additional information.
It was also publicly reported that Mr. Giuliani had met on at least two occasions with Mr. Lutsenko: once in New York in late January and again in Warsaw in mid-February. In addition, it was publicly reported that Mr. Giuliani had spoken in late 2018 to former Prosecutor General Shokin, in a Skype call arranged by two associates of Mr. Giuliani. to
On 25 April in an interview with Fox News, the President called Mr. Lutsenko's claims "big" and "incredible" and stated that the Attorney General "would want to see this."
On or about 29 April, I learned from U.S. officials with direct knowledge of the situation that Ambassador Yovanovitch had been suddenly recalled to Washington by senior State Department officials for "consultations" and would most likely be removed from her position.
Around the same time, I also learned from a U.S. official that "associates" of Mr. Giuliani were trying to make contact with the incoming Zelenskyy team.
On 6 May, the State Department announced that Ambassador Yovanovitch would be ending her assignment in Kyiv "as planned."
However, several U.S. officials told me that, in fact, her tour was curtailed because of pressure stemming from Mr. Lutsenko's allegations. Mr. Giuliani subsequently stated in an interview with a Ukrainian journalist published on 14 May that Ambassador Yovanovitch was "removed ... because she was part of the efforts against the President."
On 9 May, The New York Times reported that Mr. Giuliani planned to travel to Ukraine to press the Ukrainian government to pursue investigations that would help the President in his 2020 reelection bid.
In his multitude of public statements leading up to and in the wake of the publication of this article, Mr. Giuliani confirmed that he was focused on encouraging Ukrainian authorities to pursue investigations into alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and alleged wrongdoing by the Biden family. 12
On the afternoon of 10 May, the President stated in an interview with Politico that he planned to speak with Mr. Giuliani about the trip.
A few hours later, Mr. Giuliani publicly canceled his trip, claiming that Mr. Zelenskyy was "surrounded by enemies of the [U.S.] President... and of the United States."
On 11 May, Mr. Lutsenko met for two hours with President-elect Zelenskyy, according to a public account given several days later by Mr. Lutsenko. Mr. Lutsenko publicly stated that he had told Mr. Zelenskyy that he wished to remain as Prosecutor General.
Starting in mid-May, I heard from multiple U.S. officials that they were deeply concerned by what they viewed as Mr. Giuliani's circumvention of national security decisionmaking processes to engage with Ukrainian officials and relay messages back and forth between Kyiv and the President. These officials also told me:
that State Department officials, including Ambassadors Volker and Sondland, had spoken with Mr. Giulianiin an attempt to "contain the damage" to U.S. national security; and
that Ambassadors Volker and Sandland during this time period met with members of the new Ukrainian administration and, in addition to discussing policy matters, sought to help Ukrainian leaders understand and respond to the differing messages they were receiving from official U.S. channels on the-one-hand, and from Mr. Giuliani on the other.
During this same timeframe, multiple U.S. officials told me that the Ukrainian leadership was led to believe that a meeting or phone call between the President and President Zelenskyy would depend on whether Zelenskyy showed willingness to " play ball" on the issues that had been publicly aired by Mr. Lutsenko and Mr. Giuliani. (Note: This was the general understanding of the state of affairs as conveyed to me by U.S. officials from late May into early July. I do not know who delivered this message to the Ukrainian leadership, or when.) See Enclosure for additional information.
Shortly after President Zelenskyy' s inauguration, it was publicly reported that Mr. Giuliani met with two other Ukrainian officials: Ukraine's Special Anticorruption Prosecutor, Mr. Nazar Kholodnytskyy, and a former Ukrainian diplomat named Andriy Telizhenko. Both Mr. Kholodnytskyy and Mr. Telizhenko are allies of Mr. Lutsenko and made similar allegations in the above-mentioned series of articles in The Hill.
On 13 June, the President told ABC' s George Stephanopoulos that he would accept damaging information on his political rivals from a foreign government.
On 21 June, Mr. Giuliani tweeted: "New Pres of Ukraine still silent on investigation of Ukrainian interference in 2016 and alleged Biden bribery of Poroshenko. Time for leadership and investigate both if you want to purge how Ukraine was abused by Hillary and Clinton people."
In mid-July, I learned of a sudden change of policy with respect to U.S. assistance for Ukraine. See Enclosure for additional information.
ENCLOSURE: Classified appendix
(U) CLASSIFIED APPENDIX
(U) Supplementary classified information is provided as follows:
(U) Additional information related to Section II
According to multiple White House officials I spoke with, the transcript of the President's call with President Zelenskyy was placed into a computer system managed directly by the National Security Council (NSC) Directorate for Intelligence Programs. This is a standalone computer system reserved for codeword-level intelligence information , such as covert action. According to information I received from White House officials, some officials voiced concerns internally that this would be an abuse of the system and was not consistent with the responsibilities of the Directorate for Intelligence Programs. According to White House officials I spoke with, this was "not the first time" under this Administration that a Presidential transcript was placed into this codeword-level system solely for the purpose of protecting politically sensitive — rather than national security sensitive — information .
(U) Additional information related to Section IV
[Redaction]
I would like to expand upon two issues mentioned in Section IV that might have a connection with the overall effort to pressure the Ukrainian leadership. As I do not know definitively whether the below-mentioned decisions are connected to the broader efforts I describe, I have chosen to include them in the classified annex. If they indeed represent genuine policy deliberations and decisions formulated to advance U.S. foreign policy and national security, one might be able to make a reasonable case that the facts are classified
I learned from U.S. officials that, on or around 14 May, the President instructed Vice President Pence to cancel his planned travel to Ukraine to attend President Zelenskyy' s inauguration on 20 May; Secretary of Energy Rick Perry led the delegation instead. According to these officials, it was also "made clear" to them that the President did not want to meet with Mr. Zelenskyy until he saw how Zelenskyy "chose to act" in office. I do not know how this guidance was communicated, or by whom. I also do not know whether this action was connected with the broader understanding, described in the unclassified letter, that a meeting or phone call between the President and President Zelenskyy would depend on whether Zelenskyy showed willingness to "play ball'' on the issues that had been publicly aired by Mr. Lutsenko and Mr. Giuliani,
On 18 July, an Office of Management and Budget (0MB) official informed Departments and Agencies that the President "earlier that month" had issued instructions to suspend all U.S. security assistance to Ukraine. Neither OMB nor the NSC staff knew why this instruction had been issued. During interagency meetings on 23 July and 26 July, OMB officials again stated explicitly that the instruction to suspend this assistance had come directly from the President, but they still were unaware of a policy rationale. As of early August, I heard from U.S. officials that some Ukrainian officials were aware that U.S. aid might be in jeopardy, but I do not know how or when they learned of it.
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